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Politics or Metaphysics? On Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals
Kristin Andrews
Forthcoming Biology and Philosophy

1. Political correctness for animal researchers
In the scientific study of animal cognitive capacities, there are some words that are
not used. Instead of describing two individuals as "friends", many prefer to speak of their
"affiliative relationship." And rather than using emotional state descriptions such as
“happy” or “sad” or “depressed” to describe an animal, jargon may be introduced.
However, some terms are used without concern; discussions of hunger and thirst, stress,
fear, and even uncertainty are considered acceptable attributions for some species. Terms
from the first group are among those whose attribution to other species is thought by
some to be a case of anthropomorphism, the attribution of uniquely human traits—
usually psychological or agential traits—to a member of a nonhuman species.
In recent years, there have been a number of theoretical discussions about the charge
of anthropomorphism itself (including the essays in Mitchell, Thompson, and Miles 1997,
Daston and Mitman 2005, and work by Fisher 1990, Kennedy 1992, Crist 2000, Rivas
and Burghardt 2002, Keeley 2004). Much of this discussion has focused on what is
meant by the charge of anthropomorphism. It can’t be that humans and animals share no
properties (since we share many biological, morphological, relational, and spatial
properties with animals). Further, it can’t be that humans and animals share no
psychological properties (else the critics wouldn’t condone talk about pain or fear
response). Recent research suggests that we share cultural properties with some species
as well. Evidence of social learning and transmission of group-specific behavior in great

apes (Bonniet et al. 2006, Horner et al. 2006, van Schaik et al. 2003, de Waal 2001,
Whiten et al. 1999, 2001, Boesch & Tomasello 1998) and cetaceans (Krutzen et al.
2005), undermines the possibility that all cultural attributions are anthropomorphic.
The empirical research on animal cognition aims to determine which attributions are
truly attributable to different species, whereas the charge of anthropomorphism is a preempirical obstacle to this research. Rather than focusing on the obstacle, I suggest that
we ignore it as prejudice, and instead work on developing methods for testing the
applicability of specific properties. The central aim of this paper is to address this
epistemological concern, and suggest a two-part method that can be used to make
accurate judgments about some mental and agential properties of other species. The first
part of the method involves extracting the expertise of caregivers—folk expert opinion.
The second part of the method involves testing the usefulness of the resulting
attributions—functionality. Both practices are part of the current methodology in human
psychology, and are used to attribute properties to people who are unable to do so
themselves.
Many psychological assessments rely on folk expert observer judgments in order to
gauge features such as personality and social adjustment. Such measures appeal to the
judgments of parents, teachers, or caregivers of the subject. The instruments that are
designed to extract expert knowledge are calibrated in part on the basis of their
functionality. If the attribution of a personality trait, emotional state, or relationship is
useful for making predictions of behavior that one did not antecedently have, then that
attribution can be tentatively accepted as accurate. The two main tasks of science,
prediction and control, rely on the use of abstract terms in order to categorize objects and

events. If the attribution of the concept is useful and if it coheres well with other
observations that we accept, then, following standard practice, that should be enough to
accept it as current theory.
We recognize the expertise of infant caregivers in the development of tests used to
attribute psychological properties to infants, and I'm suggesting that we should recognize
the expertise of animal caregivers when developing measures used to assess whether
other species have particular psychological properties as well. If the method counts as
good science for infant cognition research, then it should count as good science for
animal cognition research as well. Correspondingly, if the method doesn't count as good
science for animal cognition research, then we must be very skeptical of its use with
nonverbal humans. What I'm suggesting is that acceptance of a methodology should be
based on the same considerations, whether the subject is an infant human or a member of
another species.

2. Folk expert opinion
When a human visits a zoo, or goes on safari, she may describe the animals that she
sees in the same terms that she would typically describe a human being. A dolphin with
her mouth open in what appears to be a toothy grin may be said to be smiling, but in fact
the layperson confronted with the “smile” doesn’t know he is about to be attacked. A
chimpanzee who marches over and grabs your hand might be seen as being friendly or
curious, but may in fact be preparing to bite.
In the same way, an adult with no experience with children may marvel at the happy
smiling baby, but mother knows that her infant is ready to release his bowels. It is the

mother's familiarity with her child that allows her to make the correct attribution to her
child, and the tourists' unfamiliarity with exotic species that causes them to make the
wrong one.
Though most humans are not experts in the behavior of chimpanzees or dolphins,
most humans with children are experts in child behavior, and humans in general are
experts in adult human behavior. We gain this status as experts through our experiences
interacting with other people, rather than through explicit instruction or formal training.
It is a unique kind of expertise that does not depend on some standard pedagogy, and is at
least implicitly understood even before one's first psychology class. We know that
people have psychological properties, and we know something about how these
psychological properties are related to stimuli and behavior. What is learned in the
psychology class is built upon this folk understanding of human psychology, and while
students learn about mechanisms and breakdowns of normal mental events, and while
they may learn that some parts of commonsense psychology are false, the science that led
to the discovery of mechanisms, deficits, and failures of folk psychology are themselves
based on the lay expertise humans have about human minds. Starting at a relatively
young age, we come to learn that classes of behaviors can be described using a particular
term, and that application of the term can help us to formulate predictions about future
behavior, as well as to make sense of the behavior by embedding it into a larger
explanatory network. For example, in the West we learn that behaviors such as taking
the last piece of cake and talking loudly on a cell-phone during dinner are both described
as selfish behavior, and that both indicate a lack of concern for other people. And once

we know that someone is rude, we can use that information to predict what that person
will do in other similar situations.
Just as typical humans gain status as experts in adult human psychology through their
experiences with adult humans, parents and good teachers become experts about children,
nurses and caregivers become experts about people with dementia or other geriatric
mental disabilities, etc. The expertise developed by caregivers, nurses, teachers, and
others through their daily experiences with patients or children is recognized by
researchers. Psychologists make use of this expertise in order to form judgments about
the applicability of psychological properties to individuals. In the development of such
measures, one of the questions is whether the property will be applicable to members of
the group. In such cases, the judgments are categorical ones (though rather than taking
the category to be members of the species, it is taken to be a proper subset of the species).
Once the measures have been tested for validity, the judgments that we make using them
are situational and pick out individual differences.
There exist many psychological instruments that are used to attribute psychological
properties to humans who themselves do not have the concepts or the words to describe
the properties that are attributed to them. Parents and teachers assess children’s
emotional and social development using The Child Behavior Checklist (Achenbach &
Edelbrock 1983). The Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow, Balla, & Cicchetti
1984) determine the personal and social skills of children and low-functioning adults
based on caregiver interviews. There are other measures for humans near the end of life,
such as the Social-Adaptive Functioning Evaluation (Harvey et al. 1997) which is used
by nurses to rate social and functional impairment in geriatric patients. Instruments such

as these are widely used to assess personality, social development, intelligence, emotional
adjustment, communication skills, and other psychological factors among children who
cannot speak for themselves and adults who are low functioning or suffering from
dementia.
The assumptions behind these instruments are that caregivers have knowledge of their
charges, and that this knowledge can be extracted. Just as the caregivers of human
infants or low-functioning adults have expert knowledge due to their familiarity with
such people, we should expect a similar expertise among the human caregivers of other
species. Experts on animal behavior include human caregivers, technicians, and others
who work with captive animals, as well individuals who have spent a significant amount
of time observing the behavior of individual animals in the field.i The method I’m
calling folk expert opinion takes advantage of the knowledge gained by this experience,
by treating those who are familiar with the individuals in the same way standard tests of
human children treat parents, teachers, and other caregivers. Though I am calling these
people experts, it is important to note that they need not have any formal academic
training in animal psychology or behavior. They are experts by virtue of their experience
with animals, just as human parents become experts about their children’s temperament,
cognitive capacities, relationships, and so forth. Given this point, the kind of expertise
that I am talking about is an expertise through acquaintance, rather than an expertise
through training. Caregivers have acquaintance knowledge of their charges, a kind of
knowledge that scientists or other formal experts may lack.
One way to acquire folk expert opinions on the applicability of mental properties to
other species is to start with well-established measures of human temperament,

personality, social cognition, relationships, and so forth. Instruments that measure these
properties can be appropriately modified, given to zookeepers and other species experts,
and tested for reliability using standard psychological methods. For example, The
Caregiver-Teacher Report Form for Ages 1 ½-5 from the Child Behavior Checklist
includes items such as “Avoids looking others in the eye” and “Apathetic or
unmotivated” that may be directly applicable to other primates, but probably will not pick
out individual differences among all mammal species. In other cases, relevant changes
will have to be made given the different ecological considerations for the species being
examined. For example, the same instrument also includes items such as “Doesn’t know
how to have fun; acts like a little adult” and “Speech problem” which may not be
appropriate for measuring the psychological state of any other species. In the move from
the human species to each nonhuman species, validity will have to be confirmed, and
inter-rater reliability will have to be assessed.
The method of folk expert opinion has already been used in the development of
personality factors for a number of different species. Orangutans, chimpanzees, cats,
dogs, even octopi and guppies are among the species whose personality dimensions have
been subject to analysis by means of the same methods used to construct the Five-Factor
Model (FFM) of human personality (Gosling and John 1999). The human FFM was
developed to describe the way attributions of trait terms group together into statistically
significant clusters, and it organizes personality into five domains: Neuroticism,
Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. While
there remains controversy about the accuracy of the FFM (and philosophical worries
about the nature of personality more generally), supporters of this approach have argued

that most individual differences can be described using this model (Digman 1990) and
that there are underlying genetic factors related to these domains (Bouchard & Loehlin
2001 have a review).
When this model is applied to other species, subjects have typically been part of zoo
or aquaria exhibits, rather than research subjects or wild animals. Psychologists ask
experts familiar with the animal’s behavior, such as zookeepers or other people involved
in daily husbandry or training activities, to rate a subject using the same methods used in
developing the human FFM. King and Figueredo (1997) and Weiss, King, & Perkins
(2006) used this method to assess personality in chimpanzees and orangutans,
respectively. As with the development and implementation of the FFM, raters are given
lists of adjectives and asked to rate an animal on a 7–point Likert scale (on which 1
indicates total absence of the trait and 7 indicates extremely large degrees of the trait).
Adjectives and descriptions on the orangutan scale include:
DEFIANT: Subject is assertive or contentious in a way inconsistent with the usual
dominance order. Subject maintains these actions despite unfavorable consequences
or threats from others.
PROTECTIVE: Subject shows concern for other orangutans and often intervenes
to prevent harm or annoyance from coming to them (Weiss, personal
communication).
Raters’ judgments are then assessed for statistical reliability both within and between
raters. The results indicate some differences and many similarities between human,
chimpanzee, and orangutan personality factors. For example, while human factors of
personality are limited to the five factors listed above, the chimpanzees showed six
factors of personality. The chimpanzee model includes correlates for all the human
factors, plus an additional factor for dominance (King & Figueredo 1997).ii Orangutans,

on the other hand, showed only the orangutan correlates for Neuroticism, Extraversion,
Agreeableness, and Dominance, but also showed a factor that is a combination of
Conscientiousness and Openness that was called Intellect (Weiss, King, & Perkins
2006).iii
While one might take issue with the factor analysis of personality in general, if the
critic wants to undermine the chimpanzee and orangutan results, then, barring any unseen
differences in the methods used for animals and those used for humans, she would be
forced to criticize the human studies as well. That is, if the human studies and the animal
studies are methodologically parallel, than their acceptability should rise and fall
together. To reject these studies as inapplicable to animals because they are in a different
category to begin with is to beg the question.
Nonetheless, since instruments such as the Child Behavior Checklist and The
Orangutan Personality Trait Assessment rely on the judgments of individuals who are
familiar with the target subjects, there may be concerns about justifying ascriptions based
solely on consensus. For example, to ask a question about personality among members
of a species is to assume that members of that species have personalities. The critic might
note that one could put together a similar survey designed to ascribe personality traits to
automobiles, but since automobiles clearly don’t have mentalistic properties, the
attribution of personality to animals is no indication that they have mentalistic properties.
In addition, one might be concerned that the expert opinions cohere with one another
not because they have all noticed some objective feature of the subject, but because they
are part of a human narrative, and constructed together as a group. Thus, when asked
about an individual's flourishing or personality traits, a caregiver might respond based on

how she hears others talk about the animal. A group of caregivers working with
orangutans, for example, might have all agreed that one young male is the policeman, and
another young male the thief. They may then talk about the animals using those terms
and other associated concepts. Once it comes time to fill out a survey about the
orangutans' personality or flourishing, each caregiver's answer will be affected by this
practice of discussing the individuals as having these properties.
Such concerns might lead a critic to conclude that the expertise of the caregivers
is a pseudo-expertise, which like the "expertise" of astrologers, doesn't correspond to any
objective state of affairs. However, there is an important distinction between the two
kinds of groups. The astrologers may agree that the position of planets when a person is
born determines some of their personality traits, but this is because the astrologers read
the same books or trained with teachers from the same school. Their expertise, like the
expertise of other discredited movements, tends to be an expertise that is gained
discursively, through academic (or pseudo-academic) training. The expertise shown by
caregivers is of a different sort. Caregivers, for the most part, do not get training in
personality, emotions, or mental states before they begin caring for their charges. Their
expertise is non-academic, and non-discursively learnable. It is an expertise than comes
from a familiarity through association with their charge. In the intersubjective expert
opinion of caregivers, consensus is not reached because the experts trained together in
how to correctly rate individuals on personality or flourishing surveys. Rather, the
instruments are used to capture the kind of knowledge that is developed through hands-on
experience with the subject.

Of course, the caregivers can be wrong about their charges, and they may sometimes
attribute properties based on a folk narrative constructed by the caregivers as a group.iv
This brings us back to the original concern—perhaps the properties that the caregivers
perceive are nothing more than false attributions. Perhaps only humans have emotions,
personality, or mental states. After all, many mental states are thick functional terms that
relate not only to other mental states, but to social roles and expectations as well.
A few things can be said in response to this worry. First, like many folk concepts,
mental and agential concepts are umbrella terms, and there are no necessary and
sufficient criteria for their applicability. There are kinds of friendship, degrees of
selfishness, and forms of extroversion.

For example, we might describe the relationship

between an adult and a child as a friendship, but not expect that the relationship live up to
the ideal of an adult friendship. In a time of need one wouldn't expect the child friend to
offer financial or practical assistance, or much in the way of sophisticated emotional
support. Yet calling a child a friend indicates that to some extent, some of the features
typical of friendship exist in the relationship between the two individuals. Applicability
of mental and agential terms are likely based on some kind of probabilistic operation that
relies on prototypes or exemplars, and that can make sense of claims such as "My dog is
a good friend."
There is also some biological support for the claim of continuity of the mental across
at least some species, given what we are learning about the biological and genetic basis
for some mental properties and personality traits. For example, humans and other
primates produce cortisol when they are experiencing high levels of stress. The shared
hormonal substrate between humans and some other species, and the correlation between

cortisol levels and stress in humans have led to an acceptance among animal scientists to
speak of stress in other species—and it has led to research programs investigating the
stressors, such as dominance rank, that an individual must contend with (Abbott et al.
2003).
In addition, the hormonal studies, like the personality studies, are based on
hypotheses about the psychological states of other species that were formulated after
observing species typical behavior. Among primates, it was noted early on that there are
individual differences in behaviors, and a flexibility of behavior, and the hypotheses are
developed according to an inference to the best explanation strategy. It was the
recognition of widespread individual differences that led to the development of the
human FFM of personality, and it is the same observation that has led to the development
of personality measures for other species.
When caregivers disagree about a specific attribution, the mistaken attribution need
not entail that the trait cannot be accurately attributed to the species. Humans make
errors in attributing mental states to one another, and while we may disagree about what a
person is feeling, the disagreement is based on the shared commitment that people can
have those sorts of feelings. There are many reasons for humans to make—and believe—
false attributions about themselves and others, as we know from social psychology. It is
for this reason that instruments were designed to extract caregivers' expert knowledge,
rather than accepting any attribution a caregiver might make. Instruments that measure
children's personality, social flourishing, intelligence, etc. assume that there is some
knowledge in the caregiver that can be acquired using such methods, but genuine

knowledge must be distinguished from pseudo-knowledge by looking at the functionality
of the attributions.
Caregivers gain knowledge of their charges by looking for correlations, by implicitly
making inductive generalizations, and testing predictions—the same thing humans do in
the development of their everyday folk psychology. Functionality and folk expert
opinion work together in folk psychology as well as in the science of psychological
instruments. Our adult human folk psychology, just like a parent's folk child psychology
or a zookeeper's folk orangutan psychology, is a strategy for understanding behavior that
is adopted because it is functional. To determine whether it is meaningful to apply a
mental term to a nonhuman animal, we must determine whether it is useful to do so.

3. Functionality of terms
When a term is deemed acceptable for use with a particular species, it is typically
because the applicability is demonstrable given the term's predictive force. For example,
dominance rank is a property that is widely used to describe individuals in many social
animal species, and the use of that term allows researchers and caregivers to formulate
predictions about how the individuals will respond to particular events.
When we use the criterion of functionality, what we see is that properties such as
friendship, which are not considered scientific among some researchers (Silk 2002), can
be used to make predictions that serve to improve conditions for animals in captivity. For
example, while doing her dissertation research on stress in rehabilitant orangutans,
Raffaella Commitante noticed that when orangutan friends were housed together, they
were less stressed. When friends were split apart, or when enemies or bullies were placed

together in a cage, stress levels, as judged by facial expressions and behavioral
tendencies, increased. In her dissertation research, Commitante found correlations
between levels of cortisol in urine and certain expressions and behaviors (Commitante
2005). She was able to use this correlation, along with her judgments about friendships
between orangutans, to suggest that the orangutans at the Wanariset orangutan
rehabilitation center should be housed in friendship groups rather than age groups. When
the animals were moved as Commitante recommended, stress behaviors declined
(Commitante, personal communication). While this may not be a surprising result, the
finding is significant because Commitante generated her prediction about stress levels by
using the term "friend". Silk argues that whether two animals are friends is not
something that is measured using objective standards, such as amount of time spent in
proximity, amount of time wrestling, etc., and that there are no necessary or sufficient
conditions for friendship.v Rather, friendship judgments are made about animals the
same way they are made about humans—the friendship relationship is something that is
noticed after spending enough time with the animals to understand species typical
behavior, and the qualities of relationships that exist between individuals.
Use of the relationship property "friend" allowed the caregivers at Wanariset to
implement a housing arrangement that lowered the stress behavior of the animals. This
example of the use of "unscientific" language to make real, behaviorally and
physiologically measurable differences in the orangutans’ daily life suggests that the
friend relationship is one that can be usefully applied to orangutans.
The expertise that caregivers develop, and the judgments that they make, can be
corroborated not only through consensus with one another, and not just through informal

predictions, but also via formal studies. To take one example, researchers who developed
personality factors for chimpanzees examined the predictive force of those personality
attributions (Pederson, King, and Landau 2004). In the study, human caregivers first
described their chimpanzee charges using the six-factor chimpanzee personality model.
The personality factors are described without reference to any specific behaviors. At a
later date (between two weeks and three years later), an independent observer recorded
the frequencies of the target chimpanzees' behaviors. When the behaviors were
categorized into five social contexts (agonistic, submissive, affinitive, solitary, and public
orientation), and the social contexts were identified theoretically with the personality
traits using folk judgments, it was found that the chimpanzee’s frequency of behaviors
were predictable based on the individual’s personality traits.
When ascribing mental states to infants, researchers justify their claims based on
the predictions that they can make from the ascriptions. Before an ascription is tested,
the judgments of expert caregivers, familiar with infant behavior, are taken as reasonable
interpretations. The caregiver's folk infant psychology can then be formally tested, at
which point the mentalistic attributions may gain greater or lesser support.
The methods used to test for mental properties in nonhuman animals can parallel
the methods used with infant humans. We begin with the expert judgments of those
familiar with the group, and develop and test hypotheses based on those judgments.
While this may sound like common sense, I advocate recognizing the store of unscientific
folk knowledge had by those who spend their lives caring for animals. Most researchers
have largely ignored this knowledge, and we should pay more attention to it. After all,
the folk knowledge we have about human behavior serves unselfconsciously as the

starting point for our research in human cognition. It is an obvious and perhaps necessary
place to start, since most researchers have a folk expertise in human behavior. But most
of us do not have a folk expertise in the behavior of other species. To gain the same
foundation in animal cognition research as we have in human cognition research, we need
to start from the same source—folk expert opinion.

4. Discussion
Relying on folk expert opinion and testing the functionality of those opinions
comprises a method used to ascribe mental properties to infants and other humans who
cannot verbally ascribe properties to themselves. If this is a reliable method in infant
cognition research, then we might expect it to be a reliable method in the case of other
species as well.
However, one might object to extending the method to animals based on the
extent of the differences between humans and nonhuman animals. This criticism may
suggest an argument from analogy justification of the attribution of mental states to
humans; humans have mental states because they are relevantly similar to me, and I have
mental states, whereas animals don't because they are not relevantly similar to other
humans. Rather than reviewing the well-known problems with arguments from analogy,
I will instead examine what those possible differences might be. For the criticism to hold
any weight, it must articulate what the differences are and how they are relevant.
An obvious difference between humans and other species is that only humans use
a natural language, and there is a long history of arguing that animals can't have
psychological characteristics because they don't have language. However, in the context

of this argument, the difference is irrelevant. The existence of psychological instruments
to identify the psychological properties of pre-linguistic infants and adults with dementia
implies that using language is not necessary for having mental or agential properties.
While language use cannot be the relevant difference, we must take a related
concern more seriously. One might suggest that the methods for ascribing mental
properties to infants rely on human concepts, and the conceptual division of the world
may differ between species. The criticism might go like this: While it makes sense to use
expert opinions to judge well-being, personality, or relationships of humans, this is
because humans are the ones with these concepts. Animals don't have such concepts and
so it is incorrect to attribute those concepts to them. We know that animals don't have
those concepts, because in order to have them they would have to have a host of other
concepts that we know they don't have, concepts that connect in a rich semantic web of
related concepts. And even if they have some similar concepts, we cannot know what the
content of those concepts are for them. By using our concepts to describe the agential or
psychological properties of individuals across species, we may be implying too much.
This kind of concern appears to be widely held, though to different degrees.
Stich, for example, writes, "nothing we could discover would enable us to attribute
content to an animal's beliefs" (1979, 23). Others demonstrate a more tempered worry.
Keeton writes:
Almost all of our words have some sort of human connotation, imply some sort of
human motivation and purpose. But such motivation and purpose may have no
relevance to the behaviour of other animals, and we must constantly guard against
unwarranted attribution of human characteristics to other species…English (like
all human languages) having been developed around human activities and human
interpretations, invariably reflect these, often with a strong cast of
supernaturalism… . You are cautioned, therefore, to recognize the pitfalls

inherent in any application of human-oriented language to the activities of other
animals… (op. cite Kennedy 1992, 1).vi
Keeton's concern applies just as well to attributions made across cultures or to our
hominid ancestors, and cognitive anthropologists and comparative linguists have
accepted this caution. Fifty years ago, the anthropologist Ward Goodenough addressed
this issue in his classic article "Residence Rules". In this article, Goodenough tries to
determine why the ethnographic data on the rules of residence in marriage for Trukese
society taken by John Fisher differed significantly from his own data, even though they
were collected in the same community within three years of each other (Goodenough
1956). His conclusion is that the differences were due to the different theoretical
approach taken by himself and Fisher—the difference between ethnography and
ethnology. When ethnographers look at a society, they are trying to discover its
principles and concepts in order to describe group practices using the group's own
framework. Comparative ethnologists look for similarities across groups, and use their
own concepts to organize the society that they are investigating. These two methods can
lead to different conclusions about how to describe a society.
When investigating the psychology of other species, researchers can take Keeton's
caution to heart and attempt an ethnography of the species rather than an ethnology.
Depending on the goals of the research, however, it may be necessary to attribute human
concepts in order to make judgments about similarities and differences across species. In
the later case, we are applying concepts to individuals that they wouldn't—and couldn't—
apply to themselves. This theoretical approach is criticized not only by those concerned
about anthropomorphism in animal cognition research, but also by the postmodern critics

of anthropology who decry the hegemony of the West and criticize the attribution of
"uniquely Western" notions to the oppressed peoples of the global south. Both groups
agree that “we” ought not apply our traits and notions to “them." The difference lies only
in the referents of the pronouns.
Such concerns imply that different groups must share concepts in order to enjoy
cognitive similarities. However, there is reason to reject this assumption. To take one
example, Eckman's work on emotions shows extensive cultural consistency regarding the
emotions of anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, and surprise (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen
1969, Ekman 1970, Ekman & Friesen 1971). He found, in addition, that there is
widespread similarity of facial expressions that correlate with these emotions, across
cultures. Though there are different words used to describe the emotions, and different
conceptual divisions and associations, the physiological similarities allow us to make
emotional attributions across cultures.vii Physiological similarities across species can
likewise be used to make attributions to animals, even if the concepts attributed are not
part of the species' conceptual framework.
An additional reason for being unworried about attributing properties to an
individual when they don't have the concept themselves is that we readily do so when it
comes to human children. For example, we ascribe beliefs to children before they begin
to have facility with the belief concept around age 4, yet we largely accept that children
younger than 4 have the beliefs that we ascribe to them. Current child psychology
accepts that children have beliefs before they have the concept of belief, and the same is
true of many other mental states. The first worry, that we cannot ascribe psychological
properties to individuals who do not themselves have that concept, should be set aside.

The critic, however, may remain unconvinced. The relevant difference between
humans and other need not be at the level of conceptual framework. Rather, the
difference may be biological. With humans, we can be relatively confident that applying
our concepts to people in different cultures is accurate, because, despite cultural
differences, we share a common evolutionary history, common DNA, common life
trajectory, common morphology, and common basic needs for survival. And, since the
construction of language was a collaborative human activity, the notions that became
words in human languages are ones that are applicable to us. Because of the biological
similarities and similar histories, our mental states attributions across humans will tend to
be correct. But across species, as biological, morphological, or behavioral differences
increase, the justification of our attributions will decrease as well.
While this claim is likely true, the observation doesn't help defend the critic's
position because it doesn't allow for a clear line to be drawn between humans and other
species. Consider the different ways in which one might answer the question about who
is more similar to a human neonate—a chimpanzee neonate or an unrelated adolescent
human. In some ways we would expect the two neonates to be most similar. For
example, the human and chimpanzee infants will go through many of the same
developmental stages during the first weeks of life. Both chimpanzee and human infants
engage in neonatal imitation soon after birth, and then around eight weeks neonatal
imitation disappears in both species, to be replaced by social smiling and mutual gaze
with the mother (Matsuzawa 2006). The similarity in developmental trajectory between
human and chimpanzee neonates would, according to the similarity argument, justify
attributing the same sort of psychological properties to the two infants.

In other ways—biologically or morphologically—the human neonate will be more
similar to the adolescent human. Judgments of similarity are themselves pragmatic, and
the critic who looks for a resolution to the question about the mental states of other
species through appeal to degrees of similarity and difference will, at least in some cases,
be making a decision about which features are relevant when making the determination.
The pragmatism implicit in similarity judgments that stem from our folk human
and folk other-species psychology is of the same kind. In both cases, we make reference
to properties and entities that are not directly observable in order to predict and explain
behavior. We tend to think our explanations are generally accurate, because our
predictions are generally accurate. The folk expertise in different species can be used as
a starting point to examine both the similarities and the differences between humans and
other species. If the joint method of folk expert opinion and functionality serves to
justify attributions in the human case, using the same method with other species will help
us learn which attributions we should, and should not, make.
To gauge the respects in which we are similar and different to other species is to
continue work in comparative cognition. Worries about anthropomorphism only get in
the way of cognition research on other species, and in order to avoid false attributions and
underattributions—in order to accurately determine which psychological properties a
species does and does not have—research in comparative psychology and ethology is
exactly what we need.
To answer the metaphysical question, we need to avoid the political wrangling.
The design of experiments, the choice and use of ethological methods, the analysis of the
data, the environment of the study—these are all issues open for debate, and such debates

will keep the science of animal cognition fecund. The anthropomorphism debate, on the
other hand, is a distraction from doing good science.
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i

Others share this view. For example, Rollin (1997) writes "usually the best source of
information about animal pain are farmers, ranchers, animal caretakers, trainers—in short
those whose lives are spent in the company of animals and who make their living through
animals" (p. 128), and he cites Morton & Griffiths 1985 as endorsing this view.
However, we must note that not all caretakers have the same quality of relationship with
their charges, and that those who have nurturing relationships may be in a better position
to make such expert judgments than those who are not socially involved with the animal,
or those who see the animals as commodities. The same will be true for humans as well;
the child will not demonstrate her full range of cognitive abilities when confronted by
someone she doesn't trust, e.g.. The issue is that the starting position for attributing
mental states to human and nonhuman animals will be different, unless the attributor is
familiar with and has the same quality relationship with the animal as the human experts
have with the children. Without antecedent argument against choosing the same starting
point for investigating animal and human mental states, there is no reason to place a
greater burden of proof on the animal case than we place on the human one.
ii

It has been argued by de Waal (2006) that humans should also be seen as having a
Dominance factor. His claim amounts to the charge that a reverse anthropomorphism is
at work among psychologists who are unwilling to attribute to humans a property
traditionally used to describe nonhuman species.
iii

One might think that the animal versions of the FFM are designed so as to determine
whether a particular property is applicable to a species, whereas an animal version of the

Child Behavior Checklist may be seen as determining situational applicability, rather than
categorical applicability of a property. However, if categorical applicability is to be seen
as an empirical issue, as has been argued, then in order to determine categorical
applicability one must look at individual behavior to determine whether there exists some
animal who has the property in question. Thus, methodologically speaking, we must see
a connection between situational and categorical approaches to attributing psychological
characteristics to animals. For example, when developing an other-species version of the
Child Behavior Checklist, the tests for reliability and validity serve as tests for the
appropriateness of the property for the species under consideration. If reliability or
validity for a particular feature cannot be reached, then there is reason to avoid making
claims about that property.
iv

It's worth noting that the formal research on personality in different species is careful to
avoid this criticism. Researchers collect data from different groups of humans in order to
minimize the danger of collecting shared interpretive frameworks.
v

Each of these methods of determining friendship between apes has its downsides, as
Silk (2002) shows. While she is hopeful that some more objective measurement of the
friendship relationship can be developed, at this time there is not an operationalized
definition of "friend". Thus, judgments about friendships between nonhumans will
presumably be generated in the same way as judgments about human friendships are.
vi

In his 1992 defense of neo-behaviorism, Kennedy uses Keeton's quote to describe the
position that once was orthodox. Kennedy's view is that we ought to return to this
position, and that the growing acceptance of an anthropomorphic bias is a dangerous
flirtation.
vii

I don't mean to suggest that there is no difficulty with making attributions across
cultures; when applying a term or notion from our culture, we must be vigilant. For one,
we shouldn’t understand our concepts too narrowly when working across social groups,
be they inter- or intra- one’s own culture. What counts as molestation in one group may
be seen as acceptable medical care in another. Cultural differences are real, as are
species differences. But at the same time we cannot deny the very possibility of
similarities, and we shouldn't deny that a property is applicable before we have done
empirical investigation that is based on a foundation of folk expertise with a particular
species.
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